Estimates of Own Lethal Risks and Anchoring Effects

The paper reports on an experiment testing whether agents perceive correctly the lethal risks they face personally. The results suggest that subjects exhibit comparable biases when making predictions for their own-age-cohort, or for the entire population (i.e. agents overestimate rare risks, and under-estimate common risks). The hypothesis that agents have better knowledge of their own risks, however, cannot be dismissed entirely, as responses in the own-age-cohort survey are more homogenous and better ordered. Finally, it is shown that administering surveys in succession can generate anchoring effects, which may explain why our conclusions differ markedly from a previous study. Ce papier rapporte les résultats d’une expérience qui cherchait à tester si les individus percevaient correctement les risques mortels auxquels ils font face personnellement. Les résultats suggèrent que la perception des sujets est autant biaisée lorsqu'ils font des prédictions pour leur propre groupe d'âge ou pour la population entière (c'est-à-dire que les individus surestiment les risques rares, et sous-estiment les risques les plus communs). Cependant, l'hypothèse que les individus possèdent une meilleure connaissance de leurs propres risques ne peut être écartée complètement puisque les réponses du sondage sur leur propre groupe d'âge sont plus homogènes et mieux ordonnées. Finalement, nous démontrons que l'administration des sondages en série a pu générer des effets d’ancrage (anchoring effects) qui pourraient expliquer le fait que nos conclusions diffèrent sensiblement d'une étude précédente.anchoring, health and safety hazard, rational expectation, risks perception, effet d’ancrage, espérance rationnelle, perception des risques, risques pour la santé et la sécurité

Entry and Exchanges of Cost Information

The literature on exchanges of information has ignored firms' entry decisions. Yet, the Federal Trade Commission recently expressed concerns that exchanges of information in business-to-business electronic platforms would adversely impact entry and, thus, consumers. When entry decisions are endogenized in a competitive Cournot model with cost uncertainty, we find results that contrast sharply with current thinking on the welfare consequences of information sharing.

Eliciting Beliefs: Proper Scoring Rules, Incentives, Stakes and Hedging

Accurate measurements of probabilistic beliefs have become increasingly important both in practice and in academia. Introduced by statisticians in the 1950s to promote truthful reports in simple environments, Proper Scoring Rules (PSR) are now arguably the most popular incentivized mechanisms to elicit an agent's beliefs. This paper generalizes the analysis of PSR to richer environments relevant to economists. More speci…cally, we combine theory and experiment to study how beliefs reported with a PSR may be biased when i) the PSR payments are increased, ii) the agent has a financial stake in the event she is predicting, and iii) the agent can hedge her prediction by taking an additional action. Our results reveal complex distortions of reported beliefs, thereby raising concerns about the ability of PSR to recover truthful beliefs in general economic environments.

An Empirical Model of Entry Across Airline Routes with Incomplete Information and Demand Synergies

We define a model of simultaneous entry decisions for N symmetric firms across M markets with demand synergies and incomplete information on marginal costs of production.

Social Willingness to Pay, Mortality Risks and Contingent Valuation.

The Willingness-to-Pay approach is the basic justfication for the use of the Contingent Valuation method to evaluate public mortality risk reduction programs. However, aggregating unweighted willingness-to-pay is a valid method only when individuals have the same marginal value of money, an unrealistic assumption in the presence of heterogeneity. We show that heterogeneity on wealth and baseline risk (respectively on risk reduction) leads to systematically overestimate (respectively underestimate) the social value of a risk reduction program. Using a recently published Contingent Valuation analysis, we find this overestimation to be quite modest though, approximately 15% in an upper bound case.